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Rent control:
Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. v Pearl Street, LLC, 2003
Roger Bernhardt
Rent control board’s suit alleging landlord was not entitled to charge market rate for two
units was not SLAPP suit because it was based on landlord’s alleged charging of unlawful
rent, not landlord’s act of filing documents with board.
Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. v Pearl Street, LLC (2003) 109 CA4th 1308, 135 CR2d 903
Regarding the initial rental of two units after their restoration to the rental market, the Santa
Monica Rent Control Board was presented with facts suggesting that they were not legitimate
tenancies, but simply sham rentals for an intentionally short duration to permit Landlord to
charge market rents on the termination of those initial tenancies. On learning of the suspicious
rentals, the Board sued Landlord for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that Landlord was
not entitled to charge market rate for the rentals. Landlord filed a special motion to strike the
Board’s complaint as a SLAPP suit under CCP §425.16, claiming that the suit was based on its
filing of notices to re-rent with the Board. The trial court agreed and granted the motion.
The court of appeal reversed, agreeing with the Board that the anti-SLAPP statute had no
application to the case because the suit was based on the alleged act of charging unlawful rent,
not on the act of filing documents with the Board. Although the suit may have been triggered by
the filing of the notices of intention to re-rent the two units, and even though the filing of those
notices may be an act in furtherance of Landlord’s right of petition or free speech, the suit was
not based on that act of filing but on the dispute over whether Landlord was entitled to charge
market rents for the two units, or whether those units were still subject to rent control restrictions
for initial re-rentals of units previously withdrawn from the rental market.
“Because the Landlord did not meet its threshold burden of showing that the suit was based on
protected activity, the court reversed the trial court’s order striking the board’s complaint, and
remanded for further proceedings.
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: The fact that the landlords lost their SLAPP motions against the
rent board does not mean they are going to lose on the merits as well. (You can tell the
board knows it has a difficult claim when it contends that the landlords sought to “fulfill the
letter of state rent control law while avoiding the economic constraints of the spirit of such
law,” as if there were a legal obligation to comply with what the government wanted to say,
even when it hadn’t said it.)
The landlord’s strategy was a clever one (even though it seems poorly executed): First,
declare that the property is off the rental market and evict the tenants. This doesn’t mean the
units have to be vacant: The landlord, or even his mother, as here, can live in it. After that,
he can put it back on the market and elect to pay statutory damages rather than let the old
tenant return. (I read Govt C §7060.2 as allowing a landlord do this at once, since the
sanctions are the same before and after; but this landlord apparently read it to require a oneyear wait, which is why he held off for 12½ months. If the delay is required, it was
increased by statutory amendment in 2002 to two years.) Second, rent to new tenants who

are sure to leave in a short time, so that the units can ultimately be relet again at a market
rent. The units may still remain subject to the rent control ordinance, but at an appreciated
base rent because of the effect of vacancy decontrol.
(The measure of damages is also difficult to read. Both the displaced tenant and the rent
board may recover, but I cannot tell if that makes the landlord liable twice, or only once.
Either can recover punitive damages, and the tenant can also recover actual damages. There
is no statutory explanation of what constitutes actual damages, and punitives are capped at
six months’ contract rent—which can be a bargain for the landlord when, as here, the old
contract rent was $464 per month on a unit that went for $1750 once it was freed up,
meaning that it cost the landlord only about one-and-a-half months’ new rent to get his unit
back!)
If this landlord’s strategy fails, it will probably be because the landlord blundered in his
interim renting. It may have been alright for him to let his mother move into the newly
available unit, but he should have made sure that she actually paid the rent. (After all, it was
the old controlled rate she had to pay.) And, no less important, he should have made sure
that she resided there (and, for example, turned on the faucet on occasion to run up the
water bill!).
Of course, if there is no mother available to move around like that, a true tenant may have
to be found, which always presents the risk that the tenant may later go back on his word to
vacate within the few months as promised. An agreement on quick vacating would
obviously not be enforceable under a rent control ordinance, but there must surely be some
kinds of potential tenants around—e.g., visiting law professors there for only a semester—
whose likelihood of leaving in the near future is high enough to make the risk worth taking.
(But then, what if the professor sublets to his students?) —Roger Bernhardt

